



# Elijah: Eliminating Backdoors Injected in Diffusion Models via Distribution Shift

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## 0. Injected Backdoors



## 1. Trigger Inversion



Find a trigger  $\tau$  s.t. **cats** +  $\tau$  are misclassified as **dogs**:


$$\tau = \arg \min_{\tau} \sum_{x \in X_{[1,n]}^{\text{cat}}} \ell(\text{dog}, f(x + \tau))$$

Not available in DM.

Find  $\tau$  s.t. the output distribution shift is proportional to the input's:


$$\mathbb{E}_{x_c^t}[M(x_c^t + \lambda^t \tau, t)] - \mathbb{E}_{x_c^t}[M(x_c^t, t)] = \lambda^{t-1} \tau$$

## 2. Backdoor Detection



1. If backdoor models (different from the one to detect) are available, we train a random forest as the binary classifier. Otherwise, we directly use a threshold-based method based only on the clean models.

## 3. Backdoor Removal



With inverted  $\tau$ , reduce the output distribution shift:

$$M_\theta(x_c^t + \lambda^t \tau) \approx M_\theta(x_c^t)$$

When real data are unavailable, we can use DM-generated data.

Evaluated on 151 clean and 296 backdoored models

Attack	Model	ACC $\uparrow$	$\Delta$ ASR $\downarrow$	$\Delta$ SSIM $\downarrow$	$\Delta$ FID $\downarrow$
Average		1.00	-0.99	-0.97	0.03
BadDiff	DDPM-C	1.00	-1.00	-0.99	-0.00
BadDiff	DDPM-A	1.00	-1.00	-1.00	0.10
TrojDiff	DDPM-C	0.98	-1.00	-0.96	0.04
TrojDiff	DDIM-C	0.98	-1.00	-0.96	0.03
VillanDiff	NCSN-C	1.00	-0.96	-0.90	0.17
VillanDiff	LDM-A	1.00	-1.00	-0.99	-0.31
VillanDiff	ODE-C	1.00	-1.00	-1.00	0.17

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Paper

Code



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