Privacy and Identity Management in Cloud

Rohit Ranchal, Bharat Bhargava, Pelin Angin, Noopur Singh, Lotfi Ben Othmane, Leszek Lilien

Department of Computer Science Purdue University, Western Michigan University {rranchal, bbshail}@purdue.edu, leszek.lilien@wmich.edu


> Mark Linderman mark.linderman@rl.af.mil Air Force Research Laboratory Rome, NY, USA

This research was supported by AFRL Rome, USA and NGC


Outline

- Motivation
- Identity Management (IDM)
- Goals of Proposed User-Centric IDM
- Mechanisms
- Description of proposed solution
- Advantages of the Proposed Scheme
- Conclusion & Future Work
- References
- Questions?

Motivation



Motivation



Identity Management (IDM)

- IDM in traditional application-centric IDM model
 - Each service keeps track of identifying information of its users.
- Existing IDM Systems
 - Microsoft Windows CardSpace [W. A. Alrodhan]
 - OpenID [http://openid.net]
 - PRIME [S. F. Hubner, Karlstad Univ]

These systems require a trusted third party and do not work on an untrusted host.

If Trusted Third Party is compromised, all the identifying information of the users is also compromised leading to serious problems like Identity Theft.

[Latest: AT&T iPad leak]

IDM in Cloud Computing

Cloud introduces several issues to IDM

- Collusion between Cloud Services
 - Users have multiple accounts associated with multiple service providers.
 - Sharing sensitive identity information between services can lead to undesirable mapping of the identities to the user.
 - **Cloud hosts are untrusted**

Lack of trust

Use of Trusted Third Party is not an option

Service-centric IDM Model

IDM in Cloud needs to be user-centric

Goals of Proposed User-Centric IDM for the Cloud

- 1. Authenticate without disclosing identifying information
- 2. Ability to securely use a service while on an untrusted host (VM on the cloud)
- 3. Minimal disclosure and minimized risk of disclosure during communication between user and service provider (Man in the Middle, Side Channel and Correlation Attacks)
- 4. Independence of Trusted Third Party for identity information

Mechanisms in Proposed IDM

- Active Bundle [L. Othmane, R. Ranchal]
- Anonymous Identification [A. Shamir]
- Computing Predicates with encrypted data [E. Shi]
- Multi-Party Computing [A. Shamir]
- Selective Disclosure [B. Laurie]

Active Bundle

Active bundle (AB)

- An encapsulating mechanism protecting data carried within it
- Includes data
- Includes metadata used for managing confidentiality
 - Both privacy of data and privacy of the whole AB
- Includes Virtual Machine (VM)
 - performing a set of operations
 - protecting its confidentiality

Active Bundles—Operations


- Self-Integrity check E.g., Uses a hash function
- Evaporation/ Filtering

Self-destroys (a part of) AB's sensitive data when threatened with a disclosure

- Apoptosis

Self-destructs AB's completely


Active Bundle Scheme




* E() - Encrypted Information

Anonymous Identification


• Use of Zero-knowledge proofing for user authentication without disclosing its identifier.






Predicate over Encrypted Data

Verification without disclosing unencrypted identity data.



Multi-Party Computing


- To become independent of a trusted third party
 - Multiple Services hold shares of the secret key
 - Minimize the risk



* Decryption of information is handled by the Key Management services


Multi-Party Computing

- To become independent of a trusted third party
 - Multiple Services hold shares of the secret key
 - Minimize the risk




Selective Disclosure

User Policies in the Active Bundle dictate dissemination




*e-bay shares the encrypted information based on the user policy

Selective Disclosure




*e-bay seller shares the encrypted information based on the user policy




• Decryption handled by Multi-Party Computing as in the previous slides

Selective Disclosure



• Fed-Ex can now send the package to the user

Identity in the Cloud



Characteristics and Advantages

- Ability to use Identity data on untrusted hosts
 - Self Integrity Check
 - Integrity compromised- apoptosis or evaporation
 - Data should not be on this host

• Establishes the trust of users in IDM

- Through putting the user in control of who has his data and how is is used
- Identity is being used in the process of authentication, negotiation, and data exchange.
- Independent of Third Party for Identity Information
 - Minimizes correlation attacks
- Minimal disclosure to the SP
 - SP receives only necessary information.

Conclusion & Future Work

Problems with IDM in Cloud Computing

- Collusion of Identity Information
- Prohibited Untrusted Hosts
- Usage of Trusted Third Party

Proposed Approaches

- IDM based on Anonymous Identification
- IDM based on Predicate over Encrypted data
- IDM based on Multi-Party Computing

Future work

 Develop the prototype, conduct experiments and evaluate the approach

References

- [1] C. Sample and D. Kelley. *Cloud Computing Security: Routing and DNS Threats*, http://www.securitycurve.com/wordpress/, June 23,2009.
- [2] W. A. Alrodhan and C. J. Mitchell. *Improving the Security of CardSpace*, EURASIP Journal on Information Security Vol. 2009, doi:10.1155/2009/167216, 2009.
- [3] OPENID, http://openid.net/, 2010.
- [4] S. F. Hubner. HCI work in PRIME, https://www.prime-project.eu/, 2008.
- [5] A. Gopalakrishnan, *Cloud Computing Identity Management*, SETLabsBriefings, Vol7, http://www.infosys.com/research/, 2009.
- [6] A. Barth, A. Datta, J. Mitchell and H. Nissenbaum. Privacy and Contextual Integrity: Framework and Applications, Proc. of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 184-198.
- [7] L. Othmane, Active Bundles for Protecting Confidentiality of Sensitive Data throughout Their Lifecycle, PhD Thesis, Western Michigan Univ, 2010.
- [8] A. Fiat and A. Shamir, How to prove yourself: Practical Solutions to Identification and Signature Problems, CRYPTO, 1986.
- [9] A. Shamir, How to Share a Secret, Communications of the ACM, 1979.
- [10] M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser and A. Wigderson, *Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation*, ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 1988.
- [11] E. Shi, *Evaluating Predicates over Encrypted Data*, PhD Thesis, CMU, 2008.