Lecture 07: Private-key Encryption (Definition & Security of One-time Pad)

Objective

- First, we shall define the correctness and the security of private-key encryption schemes
- We shall argue that the one-time pad is correct and secure

Private-key Encryption

- Three algorithms
 - Key Generation: Generate the secret key sk
 - Encryption: Given the secret key sk and a message m, it outputs the cipher-text c (Note that the encryption algorithm can be a randomized algorithm)
 - Decryption: Given the secret key sk and the cipher-text c, it outputs a message m' (Note that the decryption algorithm can be a randomized algorithm)

Story of the Private-key Encryption Process

- ullet Yesterday Alice and Bob met and generated a secret key sk \sim Gen()
 - Read as: the secret key sk is sampled according to the distribution Gen()
- Today Alice wants to encrypt a message m using the secret key sk. Alice encrypts $c \sim \operatorname{Enc}_{\operatorname{sk}}(m)$
 - Read as: the cipher-text c is sampled according to the distribution Enc_{sk}(m)
- Then Alice sends the ciphertext c to Bob. An eavesdropper gets to see the ciphertext c
- After receiving the cipher-text c Bob decrypts it using the secret key sk. Bob decrypts $m' \sim \mathsf{Dec}_{\mathsf{sk}}(c)$
 - Read as: the decoded message m' is sampled according to the distribution $\mathrm{Dec}_{\mathsf{sk}}(c)$

Correctness

- We want the decoded message obtained by Bob to be identical to the original message of Alice with a high probability
- We insist

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=\mathbb{M}'
ight]=1$$

• Recall we use capital alphabets to represent the random variable corresponding to the variable (so, $\mathbb M$ is the random variable for the message encoded by Alice and $\mathbb M'$ is the random variable for the message recovered by Bob)

Security

- We want to say that the cipher-text *c* provides the adversary no additional information about the message
- We insist that, for all message m, we have

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=m|\mathbb{C}=c\right]=\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=m\right]$$

Cropping any Constraint makes the Problem Trivial

- Suppose we insist only on correctness and not on security
 - The trivial scheme where $\operatorname{Enc}_{\operatorname{sk}}(m) = m$, i.e. the encryption of any message m using any secret key sk is the message itself, satisfies correctness. But it is completely insecure!
- Suppose we insist only on security and not on correctness
 - The trivial scheme where $\operatorname{Enc}_{\operatorname{sk}}(m)=0$, i.e. the encryption of any message m using any secret key sk is 0, satisfies this security. But Bob cannot correctly recover the original message m with certainty!
- So, the non-triviality is to achieve correctness and security simultaneously

One-time Pad

- Let (G, \circ) be a group
- Secret-key Generation:

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\mathsf{Gen}():
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- Return sk $\stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow}$ *G*
- Encryption:

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Enc_{sk}(m):
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- Return $c := m \circ sk$
- Decryption:

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Dec_{sk}(c):
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- Return $m' := c \circ inv(sk)$
- Note that Encryption and Decryption is deterministic
- The only randomized step is the choice of sk during the secret-key generation algorithm



Correctness of One-time Pad

• It is trivial to see that

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=\mathbb{M}'
ight]=1$$

• So, the one-time pad is correct!

We want to simplify the probability

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=m|\mathbb{C}=c\right]$$

Using Bayes' Rule, we have

$$=\frac{\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=m,\mathbb{C}=c\right]}{\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{C}=c\right]}$$

• Using the fact that $\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{C}=c\right]=\sum_{x\in G}\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=x,\mathbb{C}=c\right]$, we get

$$= \frac{\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M} = m, \mathbb{C} = c\right]}{\sum_{x \in G} \mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M} = x, \mathbb{C} = c\right]}$$

• We will prove the following claim later

Claim

For any $x, y \in G$, we have

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=x,\mathbb{C}=y\right]=\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=x\right]\cdot\frac{1}{|G|}$$

• Using this claim, we can simplify the expression as

$$= \frac{\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M} = m\right] \cdot \frac{1}{|G|}}{\sum_{x \in G} \mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M} = x\right] \cdot \frac{1}{|G|}}$$
$$= \frac{\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M} = m\right]}{\sum_{x \in G} \mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M} = x\right]}$$

• Using the fact that $\sum_{x \in G} \mathbb{P}[\mathbb{M} = x] = 1$, we get that the previous expression is

$$=\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=m\right]$$

• This proves that $\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=m|\mathbb{C}=c\right]=\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=m\right]$, for all m and c. This proves that the one-time pad encryption scheme is secure!

Proof of Claim 1

- You will prove the following statement in the homework: If there exists sk such that $x \circ sk = y$ then sk is unique (i.e., there does not exist $sk' \neq sk$ such that $x \circ sk' = y$)
- Using this result, we get the following. Suppose $z \in G$ be the unique element such that $x \circ z = y$. Then we have:

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=x,\mathbb{C}=y\right]=\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=x,\mathbb{SK}=z\right]$$

 Note that the secret key sample is independent of the message x. So, we have

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=x,\mathbb{SK}=z\right]=\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=x\right]\cdot\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{SK}=z\right]$$

Note that sk is sampled uniformly at random from the set G.
 So, we have

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=x,\mathbb{SK}=z\right]=\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{M}=x\right]\cdot\frac{1}{|G|}$$



- Encrypting bit messages
 - Consider $(G, \circ) = (\mathbb{Z}_2, + \mod 2)$

- Encrypting *n*-bit strings
 - Consider $G = \{0, 1\}^n$
 - Define $(x_1, ..., x_n) \circ (y_1, ..., y_n) = (x_1 + y_1 \mod 2, ..., x_n + y_n \mod 2)$

- Encrypting an alphabet
 - Consider $G = \mathbb{Z}_{26}$
 - Define as + mod 26
- You will construct one more scheme in the homework by interpreting the set of alphabets as Z₂₇*

- Encrypting *n*-alphabet words
 - Consider $G = \mathbb{Z}_{26}^n$
 - ullet Define \circ as the coordinate-wise $+\mod 26$